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ABSTRACT 
There have been many views and hypothesis regarding the impact of competition on banking 
performances and stability. In order to find the optimum level of competition, we should start by 
measuring the level of competition in the industry. This article shows the development of 
competition level in Indonesian banking, measured with four different methods (Concentration 
ratio, Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, H-statistic, and Lerner Index). We found that concentration 
in deposit and loan markets have become slightly more concentrated, with increasing market 
power indicated by Lerner Index. We also found that Lerner Index of Indonesian banking have a 
bimodal distribution, which indicates that Indonesian banking tend to be divided into two 
clusters based on its market power. On the other hand, development of H-statistic illustrates 
different tendencies where it indicates that banking market power is diminishing. The different 
result indicates that, even if the overall assets of Indonesian banking have become more 
productive, it has become more costly for them to earn new assets. Therefore we recommend 
Indonesian banking to do consolidations in order to gain economies of scale and scope in 
earning new assets. 
 
Keywords: Competition measurement, Indonesian banking. 
 
ABSTRAK 
Terdapat banyak pandangan dan hipotesis mengenai dampak kompetisi terhadap kinerja dan 
stabilitas perbankan. Untuk mencari tingkat kompetisi optimum, pengukuran tingkat kompetisi 
menjadi hal awal yang wajib dilakukan. Artikel ini menunjukkan dinamika perkembangan tingkat 
kompetisi perbankan di Indonesia, menggunakan empat metode pengukuran yang berbeda 
(Concentration Ratio, Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, H-statistic, dan Lerner Index). Kami 
menemukan bahwa tingkat konsentrasi pada pasar DPK dan kredit mengalami sedikit 
peningkatan, diiringi dengan peningkatan kekuatan pasar yang diindikasikan oleh Lerner Index. 
Kami juga menemukan bahwa Lerner Index pada perbankan Indonesia memiliki distribusi 
bimodal, yang menunjukkan bahwa perbankan Indonesia cenderung terbagi menjadi dua 
kelompok berdasarkan kekuatan pasarnya. Di sisi lain, perkembangan H-statistik menunjukkan 
hal yang berbeda, yaitu bahwa kekuatan pasar perbankan cenderung menurun. Hasil yang 
berbeda ini mengindikasikan bahwa, walau asset perbankan secara keseluruhan semakin 
produktif, biaya yang dibutuhkan perbankan untuk mendapatkan asset baru semakin tinggi. Oleh 
karena itu, kami merekomendasikan perbankan Indonesia untuk melakukan konsolidasi agar 
memperoleh economies of scale dan scope dalam usaha memperoleh asset baru. 
 
Kata kunci: Pengukuran kompetisi, perbankan Indonesia. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Banking industry has a pivotal role in promoting economic growth and development. It 
provides funding for productive activities and nurture innovative projects throughout the 
nation. Considering its’ vital role, it is natural that sound and superb banking industries needed 
to support an economy. An essential factor which has tremendous influence to banking 
soundness and performances is the degree of competition. 
Competition is the act of rivalry between economic actors in seeking to gain the same 
object, in the same time, and at relatively equal standing and circumstances (William G. 
Shepherd, 1990). Effective competition will bring about mutual exertion of pressure between 
competitors to perform at their optimum point. This condition will provide opportunities, 
stimulate diversity, as well as encourage firms to operate efficiently and initiate favorable 
innovations. Monopoly on the other hand tends to reduce the firm’s diligence, undermine 
efficiency, broaden inequality, and limit the freedom of choice. Since Adam Smith’s era, this view 
had become the reason underlying the urge of competition in industries. But since the year of 
1970, new theories regarding competition have arisen. Controvert with the mainstream view, 
Chicago-UCLA school argued that monopoly speaks for greater efficiency. They argue that 
monopoly conditions are earned by a party because of their exquisite attainment. Hence, the 
drawbacks of monopoly conditions are offset by superior performance of the dominant firm or 
the large scale of economies in production, innovation, or other activities. Supported by 
empirical studies, those two views are relevant in different circumstances. So considering the 
benefits and drawbacks of each competition level, what is the best degree of competition for 
Indonesian banking industry? 
Focusing on banking industry, literatures have shown variety of relationships between 
structure, conduct, and performance of banking. A generally known paradigm is structure 
conduct performance (SCP) hypothesis. This view claims that banking market structure –
including size distribution of banks, market share, barrier to entry– strongly influence banking 
conducts, which will determine their performances. Concentrated market tend to ease and 
cheapen collusion which may harm consumers interests and undercut efficiency, while 
competitive market leads banks to strive for the best strategy in overcoming their competitors 
and yield exceptional performances (Matthews and Thompson, 2008). Other view from Demsetz 
(1973) argues that concentration is the result of strong competition. Banks with superior 
performances are rewarded with higher market share, hence the changes in market structure 
should not be interfered because it represents the most efficient structure possible. This view is 
referred to as efficient structure hypothesis (ESH). Other view comes from behaviorists who 
argue that behavior is the critical determinant of performance. They argue that market structure 
matters a little, because no matter what the market structure is, if firms behave in their best 
capabilities they will produce their finest performance. Some literature also stress on the 
contestability of market. Potential competition which may enter without any barrier (or low 
barrier) may force the firms to perform at optimum level to secure their market share and 
profitability2. 
Aside from figuring the relationship between competition and performance, many 
studies on banking industry also stress the effect of competition on banking stability3. It is true 
that banking has a unique circumstances compared to other kind of businesses. Banks can 
leverage their assets with outstanding amplification rate, with debt to equity ratio sometimes 
                                                          
2 See Shepherd, W.G. (1990). 
3 See Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009), Ariyanto (2004), Jimenez et al. (2007), Boyd and De Nicolo 
(2005). 
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reach the point of 9 while other business commonly kept at 0.5 – 0.6 (Matthews and Thompson, 
2008). In addition, failure of a banking system may promptly deteriorate the whole economic 
condition of a nation, and even spread to the regional economy. These have become one of the 
reasons that banking has been one of the most regulated industries. Research have specifically 
acknowledged the impact of competition to stability, especially on the implementations of 
prudential policy in banking industry. The results can be divided into two vast paradigms, the 
“competition fragility” and “competition stability”. 
Described by its’ name, “competition fragility” view sees competitive process as a 
harmful factor to banking stability. Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009) stated that high 
degree of competition depletes market power, narrows profit margin, and reduces franchise 
value of the bank. Ariyanto (2004) stated that over-competition may lead to excessive risk 
taking –in input market as well as output market– by the banks in order to gain profit. An 
empirical research of banking in Spain by Jimenez et al. (2007) also found that an increase in the 
degree of competition leads tohigher-risk loan portfolio in Spain banking. 
Conversely, “competition stability” view believes that higher-degree of competition will 
be beneficial for banking stability. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) argue that greater market power 
will lead to higher interest charges to borrowers, which increases the banks’ risk. Higher loan 
interest charges make it harder for borrowers to repay their loans (increase default risk) and 
may aggravate moral hazard problem by the borrowers to shift to riskier projects. Banks may 
also be exposed to a set of riskier borrowers because higher interest charges will only be 
feasible by higher-return projects, which usually adhere to riskier projects. Higher concentration 
of banking market may also exacerbate moral hazard problem by the banks, who believe that 
they are too big to fail and are protected by the government safety net. 
Diverse results concluded by literatures have shown the importance of competition in 
determining the excellence and soundness of banking industry. Therefore, an optimum 
condition of competition is sought in order to accommodate the most supportive banking 
environment. The first essential step to advocate the finding is to thoroughly measure the degree 
of banking competition. This article is made to show the dynamic development of competition in 
Indonesian banking industry. Various approaches and methods to measure banking competition 
are explained to identify their difference, advantages, and drawbacks. Those methods are then 
employed to measure and identify the changing degree of competition in Indonesian banking. 
 
2. DATA AND METHODS  
In order to measure the degree of competition, we uses panel data (firm-level data) 
representing approximately 90% of Indonesia’s commercial banks in the period of 2006 to 2013 
quarterly (ranging from 107 banks to 127 banks each year). Differences of total banks observed 
are caused by incomplete reports of the banks to central bank. All possible objects are included 
in order to comprehensively identify the degree of competition on each period (this way, the 
impact of banking consolidations, newcomers, and exits will be captured). Data are earned from 
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (financial stability board in Indonesia), in form of quarterly banking 
reports. To measure the degree of competition, structural and non-structural approaches are 
employed.  On the structural approach –which emphasizes the market structure of banking–we 
measure concentration ratio (CR) and Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) to capture the degree 
of competition. On non-structural approach –which emphasize on revenue, production cost, and 
market power– Panzar Rosse’s H-statistic and Lerner Index (LI) are calculated. Different from 
non-structural approach, which measures competition based on the market share (market 
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concentration) of firms within the industry, structural approach measures competition based on 
the ability of firms to set price higher than the production cost. 
 
2.1 Concentration Ratio 
 Concentration ratio measures total market share controlled by the most dominant firms 
in industry. It will show if the market is equally shared on a large number of small firms, or if it is 
dominated by only a few firms with large market share. CR can be calculated using this formula: 
 
𝐶𝑅𝑛 =  𝑆𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where: 
n= Total dominant banks observed 
Si = Market share of bank i 
 
The advantage of using CR is the limited data it requires and the simplicity of the 
measurement. On the other hand, it can’t capture the market structure as a whole nor the 
contribution of small banks in the market. The value of CR is ranging from 0 to 100. The 
hypothesis states that more concentrated market (CR8 approaches 100) tend to be less 
competitive, vice versa. We measure CR8 (the market share of 8 most dominant commercial 
banks in Indonesia) to depict the concentration of loans, deposits, and assets in Indonesian 
banking. CR8 is used in this research because top 8 biggest banks in Indonesia consistently 
dominate nearly 60% of total market share in input, output, and productive resource market. 
 
2.2 Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
 Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index has been commonly used to measure thecompetition in 
banking industry. HHI can be defined as the sum of squared market shares of the banks in the 
market. Bikker and Haaf (2002) stated that HHI measurement has its advantages because it 
considers all banks in the industry into account and is sensitive to entrance of new banks. The 
value of HHI may range from 0 to 10000 where the upper bound indicates extreme monopoly 
and the lower bound indicates perfect competition. Iveta (2012) stated that HHI indices in the 
range below 1000 indicate a very low concentration, while HHI of 1000-1800 indicate moderate 
concentration and HHI above 1800 indicate a very high concentration. HHI is measured using 
this formula: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 =  𝑆𝑖
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Where: 
N = Number of banks 
Si = Market share of bank i 
 
 The movement of CR8 and HHI are expected to be in accordance, where they measure the 
same indicator (market share) with different method. The result of CR8 and HHI are usually 
referred to as “market concentration”. Higher market concentration indicates lesser degree of 
competition, while lower market concentration indicates higher competition level. 
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2.3 H-statistic 
 Panzar-Rosse model’s H-statistic measurement is based on comparative static properties 
of the reduced-form revenue function (Bikker and Haaf, 2002). Using firm data of revenue and 
cost, this model evaluate banking competitive behavior to determine its’ degree of competition. 
The model assumes that banks are operating in optimum condition where marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost. Therefore, the changing value between marginal revenue and marginal 
cost reflects changes of market power, hence degree of competitiveness. In this model, we use 
interest revenue as the proxy of total revenue. Interest expenses represent the cost of deposits, 
while personnel expenses represent labor cost. Administration and general expenses represent 
fixed capital cost. Control variables are also included in the equation, including banking equity, 
total loans, total assets, and other income. The first step which is applied in order to acquire H-
statistic is estimating this equation using ordinary least square (OLS) estimation technique: 
 
ln 𝑃𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1 ln 𝑤1,𝑖 +  𝛽2 ln 𝑤2,𝑖 +  𝛽3 ln 𝑤3,𝑖 +  𝛾1 ln 𝐶1,𝑖 +  𝛾2 ln 𝐶2,𝑖 +  𝛾3 ln 𝐶3,𝑖 
+  𝛾4ln 𝐶4,𝑖 + 𝜀1 
 
Where: 
Pi   = Ratio of interest revenue to total assets in banki 
W1 = Ratio of interest expenses to total assets in banki 
W2 = Ratio of administration and general expenses to total assets in banki 
W3 = Ratio of personnel expenses to total assets in banki 
C1 = Ratio of equity to total assets in banki 
C2 = Ratio of total credit to total assets in banki 
C3 = Total assets of banki 
C4 = Ratio of other income to total assets in banki 
 
 Natural logarithm is applied on every variable to capture the elasticity of dependent 
variables subjected to independent variables. H-statistic, which is represents the degree of 
competition, is earned through adding the elasticity of revenue subjected to input costs. 
 
𝐻 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 
Where: 
H ≤ 0 indicates monopoly; 
H = 1 indicates perfect competition; 
0 <H< 1indicates monopolistic competition 
 
2.4 Lerner Index 
 Lerner Index is a non-structural approach measurement which emphasizes in market 
power to illustrate the degree of competition. Based on microeconomics, LI estimates market 
power by subtracting market price with marginal cost.  
 
𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  
(𝑃𝑖𝑡 −𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 )
𝑃𝑖𝑡
 
Where: 
LIit = Lerner Index of bank i at time t 
Pit = Price for the output of bank i at time t 
MCit= marginal cost for bank i at time t 
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 LI ranges from 0 to 1, where the higher LI implies higher market power and therefore 
lower competition. LI with a value of 0 indicates a perfect competition, while LI with a value of 1 
indicates a monopoly condition. In accordance with Panzar-Rosse H-statistic model, LI assume 
that market is in optimum profit condition where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. The 
difference between LI and H-statistic is that LI emphasize the difference between price and 
marginal cost, while H-statistic tries to find the elasticity of total revenue subject to various 
kinds of expenses. Another difference is that H-statistic also takes into account various control 
variables, while LI uses trans-log total cost function to estimate the dynamic relationship of total 
cost with assets and expenses. LI has a superior advantage where it can capture the market 
power of each bank in the whole periods, while H-statistic can only capture the market power of 
banking industry as a whole. To estimate LI, we adapt the method which Iveta (2012) employed 
on measuring market power in Czech banking sector. The total cost trans-log function stated as 
below: 
ln𝑇𝐶 =  𝛼0  +  𝛼1ln𝑦 +  
1
2
𝛼2(ln𝑦)
2  + 𝛽𝑗
3
𝑗=1
ln𝑤𝑗 +   𝛽𝑗𝑘
3
𝑘=1
3
𝑗=1
ln𝑤𝑗  ln𝑤𝑘 +  𝛾𝑗
3
𝑗=1
ln 𝑦  ln𝑤𝑗 +  𝜀  
Where: 
TC = Total costs 
y = Total assets 
wjk (w1, w1, w2) = input prices (cost of fund, cost of labor, cost of capital) 
 
In the model, we use the ratio of total interest revenue to total assets as the proxy of Pit. 
Interest expenses stand as the proxy of total costs to emphasize bank as an intermediary firm. 
Cost of fund, cost of labor, and cost of capital are represented by ratio of interest expense to total 
assets, ratio of personnel expenses to total assets, and ratio of administration and general 
expenses to total assets consecutively. After estimation results are acquired, we calculate 
marginal cost using reduced form of total cost formula.  
𝑀𝐶 =  
𝑇𝐶
𝑌
 ×  (𝛼1 +  𝛼2ln𝑦 + 𝛾𝑗
3
𝑗=1
 ln𝑤𝑗 ) 
 After earning the value of price and marginal cost, we can calculate the Lerner Index of 
each bank in every periods. Lerner Index can capture the market power of each bank, therefore 
we can analyze the market power of banking in different aspects with different point of views. 
The average of Lerner Indexes in each period can also represents the development of market 
power in banking industry as a whole. 
 Different from CR8 and HHI, the result of H-statistic and Lerner Index usually referred to 
as “market power”. The movement of H-statistic and Lerner Index is expected to be 
contradictory because higher Lerner Index indicates higher market power while higher H-
statistic indicates lower market power.  
 
3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
3.1. Development of Indonesian banking Condition 
In the period of 2006 to 2013, Indonesia commercial banks faced a monopolistic 
competition (a degree of competition between perfect competition and monopoly competition) 
with a decrease of players from 130 banks to approximately 120 banks (see Figure 1.). On the 
other side, the number of offices they have increased from 9680 offices to 18558 offices, 
indicating the expansion of services they offer and the widening scope they have grasped.  
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Figure 1. Development of Total Banks and Offices, 2006 - 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistik Perbankan Indonesia, various years. 
 
 This last decade has become an expanding period of Indonesian banking business 
activities, depicted by the rapid growth of third party funding and credit (Figure 2.). The growth 
pace of credit outstand the growth pace of third party funding (with the average growth per year 
of 22.86% and 16.14% consecutively) and result a narrowing difference between their values. It 
is shown by the increasing loan to deposit ratio (LDR) from 61.56% in 2006 to 90.61% in 2013. 
In a point of view, this condition shows the increasing efficiency of banking activities where 
merely all of the deposits are successfully transformed into loans. The condition is also 
supported by declining non-performing loans (NPL) and steadily increasing return on assets 
(ROA) (see Figure 3.). Although Indonesian banking solvency is consistently supported by 
decent capital adequacy ratio (CAR), increasing LDR should still be put into concern since it may 
cause liquidity issues on Indonesian banking industry. 
 
Figure 2. Development of Third Party Funding, Total Credit, and LDR, 2006 - 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistik Perbankan Indonesia, various years. 
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Figure 3. Development of CAR, NPL, and ROA, 2006 - 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistik Perbankan Indonesia, various years. 
 
3.2. Result of Structural Approach Measurement 
 Competition may occur either in input or output market. Competition between banks 
especially arises in the effort of seizing productive resources, such as deposits, loans, and assets. 
Deposit represents the input market, while loan represents the output market and asset 
represent the productive resources market4. Measuring the CR8and HHI in three aspects (third 
party funding, credit, and asset), we find that in 2006 – 2013 the degree of concentration in 
Indonesian banking fluctuates in a fairly stable range of medium concentrated, competitive 
environment (see Table 1. And 2.). Deposit market stands as the most concentrated market, 
while assets and loan market follow with slightly less degree.  
 
Table 1. CR8 and HHI, 2006 - 2013 
HHIDeposit HHILoan HHIAsset CR8 Deposit CR8 Loan CR8 Asset 
706.3351 588.7686 667.7724 61.1062 58.1450 59.4740 
680.5169 583.8708 646.0361 60.2679 57.6297 58.5942 
726.8479 612.8978 684.5323 62.6669 59.1706 60.8250 
723.5898 611.0125 670.5889 62.5460 58.9508 54.8514 
666.2259 558.0876 613.0904 59.8647 56.1712 52.6873 
659.2707 552.3081 605.5415 59.6194 56.0431 57.3206 
643.1669 544.8717 594.8971 58.6233 55.8745 56.7505 
739.3297 585.5273 675.3159 62.3495 58.2467 60.2257 
659.4961 538.1665 614.9539 59.5499 56.0157 57.9021 
665.6442 545.8830 610.7233 60.0849 56.2068 57.9631 
655.0899 552.9673 599.4976 60.0724 56.3785 57.4883 
713.5061 583.9123 645.1676 61.9081 57.5874 59.1347 
659.8871 582.1734 606.6980 59.8118 57.1656 57.6629 
704.7078 628.9973 653.5382 62.6238 60.0041 60.5475 
                                                          
4 See Berg, S. A., & Kim, M. (1994). 
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HHIDeposit HHILoan HHIAsset CR8 Deposit CR8 Loan CR8 Asset 
719.5450 631.9264 663.6980 63.1443 60.2384 60.9829 
763.8673 643.8623 702.1172 64.9815 60.9183 62.4803 
706.2029 634.4435 636.3527 62.4781 60.3072 59.5919 
707.7123 633.7788 651.2096 62.9322 60.2536 60.6817 
682.7030 619.9911 628.8057 62.1021 59.7656 59.8208 
741.0799 626.1027 666.6069 64.4144 60.3348 61.6259 
679.6412 621.4234 633.5519 62.2489 60.1498 60.3313 
667.0293 623.5197 617.5867 61.6938 60.1507 59.5530 
665.8876 617.9734 615.8401 61.4272 59.8596 59.3486 
707.3600 614.0479 642.6834 62.9228 59.5703 60.2665 
644.5597 607.1078 606.0446 60.2912 59.3154 58.7013 
654.1394 602.2990 611.5819 60.7188 59.1215 59.0180 
646.1852 602.9131 607.0767 60.2659 59.0028 58.6682 
704.2874 621.9907 612.7229 62.4878 59.6568 56.8356 
654.8372 621.0174 610.0745 60.7788 59.4452 58.8213 
677.0350 632.3352 632.3352 61.2022 59.7405 58.7549 
667.4620 622.1957 607.1086 61.2183 59.1374 58.3330 
701.0533 625.3304 625.3304 62.6262 59.0465 58.4779 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for CR8 and HHI 
Descriptive 
Statistic 
CR8 Deposit CR8 Loan CR8 Asset HHIDeposit HHILoan HHIAsset 
 Mean 61.53 58.69 58.91 687.34 602.22 633.19 
 Median 61.56 59.15 58.92 680.08 613.47 627.07 
 Maximum 64.98 60.92 62.48 763.87 643.86 702.12 
 Minimum 58.62 55.87 52.69 643.17 538.17 594.90 
 Std. Dev. 1.44 1.55 1.91 32.05 30.69 28.09 
 
This condition indicates that there is less competition in input market. Dominant banks 
can easily capture more funding, while smaller banks need to struggle with more efforts to get 
deposits. This condition may arise because larger banks tend to have superior capability in 
providing better services (either in the context of quality or availability), accommodate 
advanced payment system, and in giving better rates. Another important reason why input 
market is more concentrated than output market is because people tend to be more careful in 
finding the place to put their important things –in this case money–, than when they try to find a 
place to borrow. In Indonesia, those dominant banks have clearly gained better societies’ trust 
than smaller banks, as the outcome of their publicity, professional services, and performance 
records.  
 Analyzing the measurement result, we classify the finding into three periods: 
(1) Since the first quarter of 2006 to the third quarter of 2007, concentration in Indonesian 
banking –in the aspect of third party funding, credit, and total assets– tend to be lessen (each 
of the CR8 decreases by approximately 2%); 
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(2) The third quarter of 2007 until the end of 2009 colored with rapidly increasing domination 
of larger banks (all CR8 increased with approximately 5 to 6 % in 9 quarters). This may be 
caused by the declining number of total banks; 
(3) On the next period (early 2010) till the end of 2013, concentration in assets, input market, 
and output market steadily decreased, but with a very slow pace. 
 
Figure 4. Development of CR8, 2006 - 2013 
 
 
 
 
Source: Indonesia Commercial Banking Report, various years. (Processed) 
 
Figure 5. Development of HHI, 2006 - 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Indonesia Commercial Banking Report, various years. (Processed) 
 
Since quarter one of 2006 till quarter four of 2011, HHI in banking assets tend to be 
higher than concentration in loan markets. This indicates that on those periods, larger banks 
tend to dominate banking fixed assets and non-loan assets (such as securities) in a higher 
degree. But after the end of 2011, HHI of total assets diminishes and have similar score with the 
36 Bina Ekonomi 
 
 
 
HHI of loan market. It indicates the growing power of smaller banks in Indonesia (starting from 
increasing contribution in fixed assets and non-loan assets). 
In general, the development of CR and HHI indicate that concentration in loan and 
deposit market of Indonesian banking tend to be stable, although in 2013 the concentration of 
those two aspects are slightly higher than in 2006 (see Figure 4. & 5.). This data indicate that 
competition in earning deposits and creating loans have become slightly looser. On the other 
hand, the concentration degree of total assets in 2013 tends to be lower than in 2006, indicating 
a higher competitiveness in seizing overall banking assets. 
 
3.3. Result of Non-Structural Approach Measurement 
The result of data processing shows that H-statistic and Lerner Index provide different 
indication regarding the development of competition in Indonesian banking. H-statistic gives an 
indication that in the period of observation, the condition of Indonesian banking has become 
more competitive (H-stat moves from 0.38 in early 2006 to 0.66 in the end of 2013). On the 
other hand, Lerner Index turn from 0.48 in quarter one of 2006 to 0.56 in quarter four of 2013 
showing higher market power owned by Indonesian banking and indicating a loosened degree 
of competition (Table 3. & 4.). Analyzing the model, we find that this difference is caused by the 
different variables (which are included in the model) and method in processing data.  
While H-statistic tries to identify the changes of total cost in every increase of total 
revenue (by estimating the increase of various expenses subject to an increase in interest 
revenue), Lerner Index tries to explain the gap between price and marginal cost.  The difference 
lies in the aspect of cost. H-statistic uses interest expenses, personnel expenses, and 
administration and general expenses (all relative to assets) as factors determining total revenue. 
This method emphasizes on cost which are created to produce revenue. On the other hand, 
Lerner Index uses trans-log model to estimate marginal cost, where this model emphasizes on 
cost which are created to produce per unit of asset. In addition, H-statistic also takes into 
account control variables, while Lerner Index does not. 
 
Table 3. H-stat and Lerner Index, 2006 – 2013 
Time H-stat Lerner Index 
2006-1 0.38 0.48 
2006-2 0.33 0.47 
2006-3 0.42 0.47 
2006-4 0.65 0.48 
2007-1 0.48 0.51 
2007-2 0.55 0.52 
2007-3 0.24 0.52 
2007-4 0.44 0.53 
2008-1 0.31 0.54 
2008-2 0.50 0.56 
2008-3 0.39 0.53 
2008-4 0.53 0.53 
2009-1 0.42 0.54 
2009-2 0.51 0.56 
2009-3 0.46 0.58 
2009-4 0.65 0.59 
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Time H-stat Lerner Index 
2010-1 0.63 0.55 
2010-2 0.61 0.55 
2010-3 0.65 0.55 
2010-4 0.64 0.55 
2011-1 0.61 0.54 
2011-2 0.61 0.54 
2011-3 0.60 0.54 
2011-4 0.65 0.54 
2012-1 0.66 0.54 
2012-2 0.76 0.55 
2012-3 0.74 0.57 
2012-4 0.86 0.57 
2013-1 0.72 0.57 
2013-2 0.68 0.58 
2013-3 0.62 0.58 
2013-4 0.66 0.56 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for H-statistic and Lerner Index 
Descriptive 
Statistic 
H-statistic Lerner Index 
Mean 0.56 0.54 
Median 0.61 0.54 
Maximum 0.86 0.59 
Minimum 0.24 0.47 
Std. Dev. 0.14 0.03 
 
Analyzing the H-statistic and Lerner Index, we learn that: 
(1) An increase of total revenue by 1% generally followed by 0.56% increase of total cost; 
(2) In average, Indonesia commercial banks can set prices of 54% higher than their marginal 
costs; 
(3) Increasing H-statistic indicate that it becomes more costly for bank to increase its’ revenue; 
(4) Standard deviation of Lerner Index is very low (0.03) indicating a very stable relationship 
between price (set by the bank) and cost per asset. Increase in Lerner Index indicates 
improvement in bargaining power of Indonesian banking during observation periods; 
(5) Analyzing the combination of H-statistic and Lerner Index result, researchers deduct that 
nowadays, an increase in asset produce lesser marginal revenue than in the past (marginal 
productivity of asset tend to be lower). This hypothesis suggests that, provided every 
aspects of banking are fixed, in the future, increase in asset tend to decrease return on cost 
(ROC) of Indonesian banking, even if the total revenue and ROA is increased. This result 
indicates that it has become more costly to increase assets in Indonesian banking industry. 
The condition may occur because of increasing competition in earning new assets (see HHI 
result above), increasing fixed asset expenses (in term of technology-based services they try 
to provide and its’ maintenance) or market penetration attempts which may be unsuccessful 
(indicated by increasing number of offices). 
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(6) The costly effort to earn new assets (as argued in no. (5) result) suggests that Indonesian 
banking will be better off if they implement merger or acquisition strategy to increase their 
assets and market share. Consolidation will give them better economies of scale and 
economies of scope5 (increase their efficiency in producing more output and making product 
differentiations). It will then give them market power to improve their profitability. The 
higher profits generated is expected to further increase their performances, including 
efficiency, profitability, and product improvements. However, this strategy should be only 
done to a certain degree because in some point economies of scale and scope may turn to 
diseconomies. Too concentrated market may also induce moral hazard to the bank side and 
its’ customers. 
(7) The development of Lerner Index is also paralleled with decreasing marginal cost and price 
(see figure 7). This indicates that market power in Indonesian banking is not only earned by 
setting a mark-up, but also earned through improvement in efficiency. 
 
Figure 6. Development of H-statistic and Lerner Index, 2006 - 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 For example: in this era, banking needs to deliver high technology-based services and payment system 
(which requires high investment) for their customers. By doing consolidation, two or more banks will be 
able to be deliver the same new services and payment system with only one investment. The thrift will 
also be applied as the output of bank increases. Consolidation will also make product differentiation, 
which uses some or overall same inputs, become cheaper. 
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Figure 7. Development of Lerner Index and Its' Components 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lerner Index can also be used to analyze the individual bank market power. Two 
histograms below compare the distribution of market power in Indonesian banking between 
2006 and 2013. Reading the histogram, we can learn that in general, the distribution of market 
power in Indonesian banking has slightly changed. Maximum Lerner Index in 2006 was 0.86 
while maximum Lerner Index in 2013 was 0.96 (see Figure 8. and 9). Analyzing the data, we 
learn that banks who have “small business loans” services tend to have higher Lerner Index (re: 
market power). Anglomas International Bank who focuses on funding small and medium 
enterprises have the highest Lerner Index (0.96) in the end of 2013. Since Lerner Index doesn’t 
consider risk in its’ estimation, this phenomenon may be caused by the risk premium they 
charge to the borrowers.  
 
Figure 8. Histogram for Lerner Index, Quarter One of 2006 
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Figure 9. Histogram for Lerner Index, Quarter Four of 2013 
Histograms above show us that Lerner Index in Indonesian banking have bimodal 
distributions. It means that there is a tendency of 2 clusters in Indonesian banking (based on 
Lerner Index). The distribution of LI in early 2006 peaks at 0.300 – 0.349 (14 banks) and 0.550 – 
0.699 (38 banks) while the distribution of LI in the end of 2013 peaks at 0.450 – 0.499 (16 
banks) and 0.700 – 0.739 (14 banks). Seeing the peaks of LI distributions in 2006 and 2013, we 
can interpret that there are 2 clusters of Indonesian banking, divided by their market power. In 
the early of 2006, cluster one (with lower market power than the other cluster) is dominated by 
domestic and medium-sized international affiliated banks. On the other hand, cluster two 
(higher market power) is dominated by regional development banks and bigger banks with 
international affiliation. Regional development banks tend to have bigger market power because 
Indonesia’s government has given them the only right to manage the wage of civilian employees, 
therefore they hold higher bargaining power to their customers than other banks. In the end of 
2013, cluster one is still dominated by medium-sized banks, while cluster two is still dominated 
by regional development banks. Changes occurred in the end of 2013 is that larger banks tend to 
leave cluster 2. Two of the biggest banks in Indonesia (PT Bank Central Asia Tbk. and PT Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk.) have earned bigger market power than banks in cluster two. 
This result indicates that larger banks tend to be better in improving their market power. This 
may be caused by their capabilities to earn economies of scale and scope. It may also be caused 
by their capabilities to deliver better services and payment system to their customers, therefore 
their customers are willing to pay higher prices. 
The changing peaks (compare 2 figures above) also shows that Indonesian banking has 
stronger market power in the end of 2013 than in the early of 2006 (indicate decreasing level of 
competitiveness). Furthermore, in early 2006 only 62% of total banks have Lerner Index above 
0.4, while in the end of 2013 there are 73% of total banks who have Lerner Index above 0.4. This 
clearly indicates increasing market power of Indonesian banking in the observation period. 
Another finding we capture is that total deposits, total loans, and total assets nearly have 
no correlations with Lerner Index6, indicating that banking in Indonesia has a very low tendency 
                                                          
6 Writers deduct that price war exists only if the correlation between Lerner Index and total resources 
earned is strongly negative, since it indicates that lower price-cost gap conveys more productive 
resources to the bank.  
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to compete through price war in the effort of seizing productive resources7. Price war has truly 
become a conventional strategy in banking competition, but there is another type of competition 
which widely occurs in Indonesia. We usually call them non-price competition. Banks are 
competing to provide high-technology based services to ensure customers’ satisfaction. Banks 
sometimes accommodate extravagant events to intensify customers’ excitement and assure 
market confidence. Furthermore, lotteries are held to encourage customers in using the bank’s 
services. Diverse products which offer initial rewards to customers are also designed. These 
strategies are widely employed in Indonesian banking in order to seize bigger market.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In the observation periods, CR8 and HHI indicate that deposit and loan markets in 
Indonesian banking have become slightly more concentrated. This indicates loosened 
competition level, a condition where mainstream view say will cause inefficiency and equality 
problems. Lerner Index also shows increasing market power of Indonesian banking, which in 
some cases may deteriorate consumer surplus (because of higher prices Indonesian banks 
charge to their customers). On the other hand, H-statistic shows increasing cost per revenue of 
Indonesian banking. While ROA is expected to be increasing (depicted by Lerner Index) the ROC 
in Indonesian banking is decreasing. This condition indicates that it has become more costly for 
Indonesian banks in seizing new assets. It may be caused by the emerging trend, where banks 
compete to provide new high technology-based services and payment system which requires 
high initial investment (fixed asset expenses). They also compete to penetrate to new markets. 
These investments have bulk the costs borne by Indonesian banks, but have also increase their 
market power hence their asset productivity. This condition suggests that consolidation, such as 
merger and acquisition, become a good option for Indonesian banks to improve their economies 
of scale and scope. Consolidation can be an option for banks to seize new assets, which are 
becoming more costly but also increasingly productive.  
Based on the findings, we argue that competition level in Indonesian banking is 
decreasing. It is true that mainstream view says that less competitive market may induce 
inefficiency and equality problems. But the phenomenon in Indonesia shows that larger banks 
tend to earn their market share and market power through high economies of scale and scope in 
their management and innovations. Furthermore, larger banks tend to have better services and 
better technology-based payment systems which promote efficiency. Superior services (in 
quality, diversity, and availability) and respectable reputation invites societies to use their 
services and willing to pay the higher price offered by the banks (consumer satisfaction and 
welfare are also improved along with increasing price). This condition supports Demsetz’s 
(1973) efficient structure hypothesis (ESH) which argue that competition in the market should 
not be interfered because it will generate the most efficient market structure. 
On the other hand, we need to put concern on the availability of financial services for 
remote societies. Efficient structure without equality will only promote the welfare of partial 
societies. Larger non-government banks tend to not reach micro, small, and medium business or 
fulfill the demand of remote societies because of higher costs and risks. If larger banks dominate 
the market, it will be harder for small and medium banks (who intend to reach SME and remote 
societies) to seize productive resources. For those problems, Indonesia’s government has 
established a rule that only regional development banks have the right to manage civilian 
                                                          
7 The correlations of total deposits, total loans, and total assets with Lerner Index in quarter four of 2013 
are consecutively -0.0488, -0.0411, and -0.054. This result indicates that price competition in Indonesian 
banking exists, but only in a very low degree. 
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employees’ wages. Incentives in form of subsidy have also issued to encourage financial 
intermediation to small and medium businesses and remote societies. But then, according to 
survey of Otoritas Jasa Keuangan in 2013, only 21.84% of Indonesia societies are categorized as 
well literate regarding financial services products. Furthermore, according to utility index by 
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, only 59.74% of Indonesia societies have the utilized formal financial 
services products. It indicates that formal financial institutions have not succeeded in reaching 
remote societies or SME. Then, do small and medium banks which focus on funding SME need to 
be, in a certain way, protected from competition? Or does authority need to set the role of each 
bank, hence its market, in the economy? 
There are still many questions regarding the influence of competition on banking, when 
this article is limited in measuring the level of competition in Indonesia. The grand purpose of 
research regarding competition is to find the optimum level of competition, which will support 
banking to work efficiently and provide finest services in a fair price. To analyze the optimum 
level of competition, further research are required, especially regarding the impact of 
competition on banking performances, stability, and financial inclusion in Indonesia. Thus, it is 
expected that banks can play their role in the best condition and encourage economic growth 
and social welfare. 
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